Central Europe is no longer Germany’s workbench

The region that once needed rescuing now drives Europe’s growth. Berlin should treat it as a partner at eye level, writes economist and manager Jan Ruzicka.

For two decades, Germany looked at its eastern neighbours and saw a workbench. Cheap labour, reliable suppliers, short trucking distances. It was a useful model, and it made both sides richer. But it no longer describes reality. Central Europe has outgrown it. The region is an emancipated industrial force that needs neither saving nor subsidies.

The numbers tell the story. The European Commission expects the eurozone to grow by just 0.9 percent in 2026. Central Europe is pulling the other way. The Czech economy grew by 2.6 percent last year, Poland by 3.8 percent. Czechia now reaches 92 percent of the EU average in purchasing power per head, ahead of Portugal, Greece and, for the first time, Slovenia. It has the lowest unemployment in the Union. Estonia’s public debt stands at 24 percent of GDP, Bulgaria’s at 30. Italy’s is 137, France’s 116. Whoever is looking for a healthy Europe should look east.

Germany has noticed, even if its debates have not. In the first half of 2025, Poland overtook China as a destination for German exports. The trade flows of German industry are quietly moving from Asia back to its own neighbourhood.

From cheap wages to engineering density

The old competitive edge was low cost. The new one is engineering density. Central Europe trains engineers in numbers Western Europe has forgotten, and its factories have invested heavily in automation. Wages have risen, so plants had to become smarter, not cheaper. The result is a manufacturing base that is capital intensive, highly productive and, crucially, inside the Single Market.

That last point matters more every month. Chinese firms sell to China. American firms buy from America. The one truly open market left is Europe. Supply chains that run from Stuttgart to Pilsen or Wrocław are short, legally secure and politically reliable. After the pandemic, after Russia’s war and after years of tariff threats, that is worth more than a few cents saved per component.

The region as Europe’s protective shield

Central Europe has also done its homework where Western Europe hesitated. Poland built an LNG terminal and the Baltic Pipe long before it was fashionable. Czechia stopped importing Russian oil and secured gas from the West. New corridors, from Via Carpathia to Rail Baltica, are linking the Baltic to the Adriatic and the Black Sea.

On defence, the region is not asking for protection. It is providing it. Poland spends close to 5 percent of GDP on its armed forces, more than any other NATO member. Prague organised the ammunition initiative that kept Ukraine supplied when others were still debating. For German industry, this is not an abstract security argument. It is the shield behind which its factories operate.

A partnership at eye level

Europe needs an industrial restart, and it will not come from Brussels programmes alone. It will come from combining German engineering pedigree with Central European growth dynamics, private capital and scale. Czech and Polish companies are no longer just suppliers. They buy, build and invest, at home and in Germany. Škoda Group closed last year with record orders of almost 1.8 billion euros. Central European capital is increasingly buying into German industry, and running it well.

What the region asks for is not money, but respect. A seat at the table when Europe sets industrial policy, a European preference that rewards companies with their seat and taxes in Europe, and a Germany that sees its eastern neighbours not as an extended workbench, but as co-owners of Europe’s prosperity. Because the workbench has become a workshop.