Article from the Handelsblatt Journal Security and Defense
Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is Europe's potential Achilles' heel. The war could go down in history as the beginning of a third, major war engulfing the entire continent – or as a brutal but final gasp of autocratic violence over an otherwise victorious European democratic movement. That sounds dramatic. But nothing less is at stake.
This time, the aggression is not coming from Central Europe, but from the East. What makes it particularly dangerous is that it is impossible to predict whether the increasingly isolationist US under Trump will stand by Europe in a crisis. On the contrary. At the end of 2025, we witnessed how Washington exerted pressure primarily on the victim of the aggression, thereby contributing to a shift in what is considered acceptable in favor of Russia.
For a long time, Europe debated how European defense should be conceived. Two opposing approaches emerged: the German approach, which equated more Europe with less transatlantic ties and, fearing it would push the US out of the continent, was reluctant to substantially strengthen Europe's defense capabilities; and the French approach, fueled by deep-seated skepticism towards the US, which primarily translated more Europe as more France. Even if Germany's motives were honorable—after all, NATO was founded to keep the US "in"—France's analysis was correct. This risk was inherent in the system, because a country with only two borders, neither of which border Europe, can politically turn away from the European continent at any time without facing existential risks. This realization is now slowly gaining traction even among the strongest proponents of the transatlantic alliance.
Berlin is only acting half-heartedly.
Contact with the USA will not completely break down. The friendship can even be deepened through the German federal states. But: Defense is made in Washington, and it is foreseeable that someone will be in charge there who views Europe with at least indifference, and in the worst case, as a Russian sphere of influence. This is dangerous and should prompt swift action on the European stage. A conservative German politician recognized this earlier than any other conservative in Europe: Ursula von der Leyen. Since 2022, she has used the instruments available to her within the legal framework to strengthen the European idea in defense. Meanwhile, a Europe-forgetful CDU/CSU, in opposition, was still submitting motions in the German Bundestag that viewed arms industry funding purely nationally. Remarkably historically ignorant for the party of Helmut Kohl and Konrad Adenauer, both of whom understood the core meaning of Western integration and the role that both defense and industrial policy play in it.
The current Chancellor remains elusive. Rhetorically, he was clearer even in opposition, and politically, as head of government, he is neither faster nor more consistent than Olaf Scholz. The snap election and the election of Friedrich Merz were also linked in Europe with the hope that someone would assume responsibility in Berlin who recognized the central role Germany will play in the defense of the continent, simply because of its geography. But the next wave of disappointment is already sweeping through the capitals of Europe, partly because Berlin continues to use strong words but acts too late or only half-heartedly – and never without the USA.
Skirt-tip course not without alternatives
What we need now to protect ourselves from the worst is a simultaneous political and economic mobilization in Europe, coordinated by France and Germany. Precisely because these two countries entered the crisis with such different security policy assumptions, they should now join forces particularly closely. This partnership can become an engine of European defense, but the goal must not be to find a middle ground that harms no one. Instead, it must be about bringing everyone to the table—from the Nordics to the Baltics, Poland, and Great Britain—who understand what is at stake and are prepared to risk their relationship with the US in order to save their own continent.
Europe is materially, economically, and demographically stronger than Russia. Our population is better educated and more resilient. There is no reason why we could not repel Russian aggression. But this strength does not automatically guarantee protection. A high gross domestic product is no deterrent unless it translates into capabilities, industrial capacity, and political resolve.
I do not share the concern that there are existential dependencies that make this close-knit approach the only option. The dependencies between Europe and the USA are reciprocal – political, industrial, and military. Europe would be capable of positioning itself in such a way that it could defend itself even without American backing, should the need arise.
Ukraine as a daily reminder
Ukraine has shown how much innovative power an external threat can mobilize, and there's no reason to doubt that the same would be true in Europe. Wherever I go, I meet companies with ideas, people who want to prepare.
But the political will to mobilize this innovative capacity and the will to defend ourselves even before a direct attack is still lacking. This may also be because we Germans no longer have any memory of what it's like to be invaded. We were the aggressors. Here, too, Germany can learn something from France. We must all be clear about one thing: war doesn't become less likely simply because we fail to prepare to defend ourselves. And a glance at Ukraine vividly demonstrates every day what we personally stand to lose.
Photo: © Anne Hufnagl (portrait)
