How can the systematic ramp-up of the necessary production capacities for the defense industry be achieved in order to effectively and victoriously repel a potential Russian attack on NATO territory by 2029, with the combat readiness of the German armed forces vehemently demanded by Defense Minister Boris Pistorius? Key military policy issues, such as the troop build-up to be realized after the turn of the era, Europe's defense sovereignty, and Germany's new space security strategy, were at the top of the agenda at the "Handelsblatt Conference on Security and Defense 2026" in Berlin.
Federal capital Berlin. In the landscape of defense policy conferences, the Handelsblatt Conference on Security & Defense has long been a flagship event for those focused on resilience. Regularly held in the German capital, the three-day event in 2026 attracted around 400 top military officials and defense managers, diplomats and defense experts, as well as numerous media representatives to the Spree River. Among the key topics were the mega-themes of the stability of the transatlantic defense alliance and European sovereignty, accelerated defense policy initiatives, new defense technology startups and disruptive arms markets, and Germany's security ambitions in space. Like no other event violating international law, the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022 continues to document the fundamental geopolitical power shift in the heart of Europe.
Trump's Greenland debacle: a transatlantic stress test
And yet, Moscow's Soviet-style lust for power and reconstruction was initially overshadowed by debates surrounding the bizarre Greenland and Arctic ambitions of the US Trump administration. These debates, following Europe's joint military presence in Nuuk and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte's conciliatory intervention at the Handelsblatt Security Conference, were accompanied by a generally subdued tone. Among those commenting was Dominik Mutter, Political Director at the German Foreign Office, who compared Trump's strategic unpredictability to a transatlantic stress test, yet despite the considerable strain on the alliance, he maintained Washington's fundamental commitment to the alliance. The top diplomat argued against a shift in security policy perspective, asserting that the central threat to Europe and the alliance came from Putin, not Trump.
The ruler Putin is the main threat to Europe.
Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss, Director General of the EU's External Action Service, argued in a similar vein, characterizing the distraction narrative, which has shifted the focus to Trump, as a misguided signal of global political priorities. Both diplomats pointed to the Kremlin's massive rearmament activities, which starkly reflect Europe's absolute vulnerability. The Russian military arsenal is growing and is not only directed against Ukraine, "it is directed against us," as Mutter emphasized, adding that people must be told clearly "what awaits us if" we do not increase defense spending "for deterrence." In this context, von Seherr-Thoss pointed to pan-European arms procurement, which she considers problematic, as national egoism, persistent fragmentation of weapons systems, and a lack of coordination have long hampered a European procurement strategy, the European diplomat stated.
Claudia Major: Strengthening Europe's military pillars
These criticisms were unanimously shared by military expert Claudia Major, Senior Vice President for Transatlantic Security Initiatives at the German Marshall Fund. If there are brutalized states worldwide that believe war is efficient and legitimate, then Europe – and above all the Big Three: Germany, France, and Great Britain – must invest in sustainable defense out of conviction. At the same time, Major emphasized the need to utilize Europe's existing potential for improvement to ensure a significant increase in security policy planning, reliability, and predictability.
Against this backdrop, Major urged a more self-confident, independent, and sovereign Europe. This would also prevent increasing dependence on the US, which, given its geopolitical shift in priorities towards China and the Indo-Pacific, has long considered Europe a self-reliant power in continental conflicts. Despite all global disruptions and volatility, Europe should be militarily prepared for the possibility that "its greatest ally" might give them the middle finger, as Major put it.
In summary, the security and foreign policy panelists concluded that the historic impact of the Ukraine war, a century-long turning point dominated by massive losses and destruction, has undeniably led to a fundamental reorientation of NATO doctrine within the Western alliance. As recently decided at the NATO summit in The Hague, the transatlantic alliance sees itself as unanimously obligated to invest heavily in armaments and the military. The aim is to be able to respond swiftly and decisively to a potentially imminent large-scale Russian attack on NATO's eastern flank around 2029. With the "security policy turning point" narrative proclaimed by Germany in 2022, the world's third-largest economy, with Europe's most powerful conventional military force, intends to assume its new defense policy role for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the continent.
30-year slumber in defense policy
To achieve its objectives, the Federal Republic of Germany intends to invest up to one trillion euros in the defense budget by the end of the decade, according to the enormous financial ambitions of the German government, with which Defense Minister Boris Pistorius aims to develop the Bundeswehr into a combat-ready, victorious, and thus war-deterrent force. However, despite massive financial injections, these ambitious armament plans, intended to materialize Pistorius's deterrence goals by 2029, are encountering enormous capacity problems. The race between money and time is currently failing due to the fact that both European and German defense policy have been "asleep for 30 years," as Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger stated in his characteristically blunt manner at the Handelsblatt conference.
Despite the considerable irritation caused by Trump's Greenland escapades, Papperger's perspective on the tense transatlantic relationship prompted him to issue a clarification on defense policy: Germany and Europe must finally deliver credible contributions to defense policy in order to be considered reliable NATO partners by the United States. The fact that European NATO members are now investing 60 percent more in defense does not automatically lead to an immediate industrial ramp-up. Months earlier, top German military officials had complained loudly and vehemently that, despite substantial orders and quantity purchases by the Koblenz Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw), the troops were still receiving too little military equipment. Due to the shortage of weapons systems, the timeframes for training the troops to be combat-ready were drastically reduced with each additional month of waiting.
According to Papperger, the shortage in the barracks is due to a lack of strategic armaments planning over many years. This presents the arms industry with a dual challenge in light of the changing military-political landscape: fulfilling current arms orders while simultaneously ramping up production capacity and integrating new software. Only gradually – after receiving orders of adequate quantities – will it be possible to transition from the current manufacturing process to mass production lines with potentially increasing economies of scale.
Due to the significant increase in production volumes, the barriers to mass production would disappear in the future; however, the complex transformation process, intensive in terms of mechanical engineering and IT, requires time. Therefore, German arms manufacturers are currently in a highly intensive conversion phase. If all these capacity increase processes were implemented and all components were in stock, it would also be possible to "assemble tanks quickly," as Papperger illustrated, thereby emphasizing the crucial role of a stable and functioning value chain comprised of professional suppliers.
MBDA CEO Thomas Gottschild urges reliable arms decisions
To ensure the timely and sustainable implementation of the government's defense plans, which are aligned with NATO's 2029 targets, Thomas Gottschild, CEO of the highly innovative Bavarian missile manufacturer MBDA, called for a fundamental change to the government procurement process. The goal of future defense policy decisions must be to establish a binding, long-term production planning corridor, as Gottschild emphasized in his keynote address on procurement and financing issues. When dealing with highly complex weapon systems such as guided missiles of various categories and military applications, investments in increased production capacity, including the construction of new factories to meet specific needs, can only be justified from a business perspective if reliable contracts with concrete long-term plans are in place, stated the MBDA Executive Group Director of Strategy and Chairman of the BDI Committee on Security.
In retrospect, and also from today's perspective, there is still a lack of strategic foresight on the customer side, preventing them from structuring defense-specific planning horizons in such a way as to ensure reliable framework conditions for the timely start and smooth production of these highly complex weapon systems. On the one hand, purchasing decisions are still made too short-term, and on the other hand, the administrative and legal concretization of the procurement processes leading to legally binding contracts continues to take too long, according to the missile construction manager primarily responsible for MBDA's strategy.
Arms procurement is a strategic instrument
From his perspective, arms procurement is not merely an administrative act, but rather a strategic instrument for sustainable national and European security. Due to the escalating security threats during the four-year war in Ukraine, Germany finds itself in a "race for munitions and guided missiles." To provide a credible and sustainable material foundation for "Mission 2029" with guided missiles, such as the Patriot ground-based air defense system, industry requires long-term funding commitments and agile processes.
Prof. Michael Eßig: Disruptive markets and innovative startups are now in focus
Under the headings "Organizational Reform in Public Procurement and Legal Acceleration of Procurement," Professor Michael Eßig focused his remarks on existing bureaucratic obstacles and legally mandated reform processes, concentrating on their concrete effects regarding faster procurement speeds and accelerated innovation. Defense procurement is undoubtedly a key capability for defense readiness, combat capability, and military success, stated the Chair of Procurement & Supply Management at the Bundeswehr University in Munich during a joint panel discussion with the MBDA CEO.
Planning and acceleration legislation benefits entrepreneurs
Thus, defense procurement and operationally relevant contracts remain in a dynamic process of change, with the new legal frameworks provided by the amended Federal Armed Forces Procurement Acceleration Act (BwBBG) and the new Federal Armed Forces Planning and Procurement Acceleration Act (BwPBBG) contributing to significant procurement simplifications, as Eßig pointed out. Specifically, the new legal frameworks lead to direct awarding of contracts by public authorities, a long-term transfer of barracks and property construction law to proactively meet the needs of the Federal Armed Forces, proactive market monitoring of disruptive innovations, easier entry for new defense technology players, and faster system implementation of future-proof military technologies, according to the Munich professor's exemplary list.
Addressing the critical arguments of MBDA CEO Gottschild, Eßig confirmed that procurement represents a crucial strategic lever for strengthening Germany's defense capabilities. Current security and defense policy is currently encountering highly dynamic, disruptive market processes that have opened the market to new players with entirely new technologies. Against this innovation-driven backdrop, there is a need not only to structurally accelerate procurement processes but also to apply the same careful attention to transparency, promoting competition, and governance. So far, the Bundeswehr's special fund has only triggered short-term innovation surges; in the long term, the goal is to place sustainable and consistently strategically aligned procurement structures at the center, according to Professor Eßig, the guiding principle for the Ministry of Defense.
Under the pressure of the "lots of money, little time" formula, Eßig further emphasized that the Federal Armed Forces Procurement Act (BwBBG) had already initiated significant contract accelerations. In traditional tenders, potential contractors had to submit their bids after only one month, with the contract generally awarded not to the cheapest bidder, but to the most economically advantageous offer, in accordance with procurement law. The new Federal Armed Forces Procurement Act (BwPBBG), with its innovation-promoting regulations, also provides new defense startups with improved access to contracts. In this context, the question, raised in the discussion with Rheinmetall Papperger, of prioritizing both traditional and innovative defense equipment in a way that ensures future viability also sparked considerable debate.
The revolutionary nature of military-technological innovation cycles, coupled with a rapidly evolving landscape of warfare, was vividly illustrated by the operational theaters in Ukraine. The startup sector likened these changes to a tactical and operational evolution from analog plowshares to digital swords, reflecting the largely transparent battlefield of current drone warfare. The debate centered on the awarding of government contracts to the most innovative forces within the defense industry. Startups, which tend to have limited equity capital, often have to rely on collaborations with established systems integrators to achieve scalable production volumes more quickly, dependent on the latter's manufacturing capacity. Scalability is apparently still more important to the German Armed Forces than innovation, criticized Mark Wietfeld, a startup robot manufacturer of unmanned land systems from Arx Robotics, who called for greater autonomy from the Bundeswehr in his remarks to Armin Papperger.
Armin Papperger: Startups have to prove that they can deliver.
Hidden champions must rapidly evolve into general contractors in the disruptive new high-tech markets of AI-controlled kamikaze drones and secure their own lucrative market shares on a permanent basis, according to Arx CEO Wietfeld. Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger brusquely denied that the rapid innovation cycles are primarily driven into the market by unconventional defense technology startups, pointing out that his Düsseldorf-based arms manufacturer spends around €600 million on research and development. The assertion that traditional systems integrators are not innovative enough is insufficient, Papperger told Arx Robotics founder Wietfeld. Ultimately, they must also prove that they can deliver, Papperger told Wietfeld.
35 billion euros for space security
Besides the geopolitical significance of the dimensions of land, sea, air, and cyberspace, a global political arena beyond Earth's atmosphere garnered particular attention. With its special theme, "Space: The Special Mission," the Handelsblatt conference's military focus led participants right into space. And thus into a sphere that still receives too little attention from the general public regarding security policy, according to Antje Nötzold of the Bundeswehr University Munich. This is despite the fact that both near-Earth and far-Earth orbits have long been a focus of global politics for major powers such as the USA, Russia, and China, as the scientist, who conducts research in Munich as a Senior Researcher in "Support and Arms Control in Space," emphatically underscored.
Therefore, Germany and Europe must learn to think in astropolitical dimensions in addition to geostrategic interests and counteract the prevailing "space blindness" through public relations, according to Nötzold, who is dedicated to this communication goal.
She also dedicates herself to this topic as Vice President of the Society for Security Policy. Because the fifth domain of human existence is continuously gaining in political and economic importance, the military relevance of space is consequently increasing as well. The availability of space capabilities, such as the exchange of information and communication based on space-based image and data streams, as well as future production, service, and research opportunities, have long since led to a second race – for example, for the best locations to establish permanent lunar bases.
Comparable to the century of world exploration, humanity's exploitation of space represents a key area for innovation and future development, with space security likely to become a fundamental necessity for Germany's and Europe's technological capability and political sovereignty. With the Space Security Strategy (WRSS) from November 2025, the German government is setting strategic priorities for a comprehensive national space security architecture for the first time, according to Nötzold. The WRSS, developed under the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, serves as a strategic instrument to protect Germany's interests in space and significantly increase the country's resilience. The German government plans to invest approximately €35 billion in developing military space capabilities by 2030.
Space security: Investments in defensive and offensive weapons
By identifying defense and security policy risks, Germany has not only recognized the astropolitical dynamics and the threat potential of possible adversaries in space, but is also actively working to close capability gaps in its space strategy, as Nötzold emphasized. The continuous expansion of military applications has also increased the technological tools available for hostile activities against its own satellites. The national space program thus envisions the future implementation and deployment of defensive and offensive assets with credible deterrent potential. The development of national counterspace capabilities will enable Germany to deceive hostile systems through cyberattacks, manipulate them electromagnetically, or destroy them with anti-satellite weapons, thereby enhancing the protection of its own geostationary systems in space.
German satellite plans: Leading nation in reconnaissance and communication
For current military operations, space-based situational awareness has long provided the foundation for real-time warfare at the operational-tactical level. Thus, military satellite reconnaissance and communication not only constitutes an essential support element for transparent information gathering, but also an independent military operations cluster – indispensable in current and future multi-domain operations as a hyperfast, real-time situational awareness monitor. According to Armin Fleischmann, Head of Planning and Digitalization at the Cyber and
According to the Major General, Germany must significantly increase its strength in space to be able to exert a deterrent effect there as well. He is therefore relying on the implementation of the WRSS (World War II Space Defense System) in terms of military equipment, which will initially be based on the imminent near-Earth geostationation of three Synthetic Aperture Radar (SARah) satellites. These satellites will replace the Bundeswehr's existing five SAR-Lupe systems, which are being removed from orbit by burning up in the atmosphere.
The future SARah trio will be able to conduct reconnaissance through cloud cover and at night, according to Fleischmann, who praised the high quality and resolution of the imaging systems. However, Fleischmann sees the focus of German satellite reconnaissance and communication, due to their future positioning in low Earth orbit, not as global, but concentrated on NATO's eastern flank. The proximity of the military satellites to Earth allows for extremely fast signal transmission to the troops' encryption devices. Protected against enemy interference by end-to-end encryption, the space-based situational information will be available virtually in real time and can thus be fed almost instantaneously into the networked weapon systems and command posts on Earth.
Active role for Europe's space security
By 2029, the number of German reconnaissance and communications satellites is expected to rise to three figures, making Germany the world's second-largest military space user after the USA. With its ambitious WRSS program, Germany would, by 2030, stand alongside the USA at the forefront of NATO as a powerful space nation and could make an active contribution to the collective strengthening of Europe's space-based security and sovereignty: as a provider of defense policy information and an important point of reference for smaller allied partner states.
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